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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between recursive enumerability and elementary
frame definability in first-order predicate modal logic. On the one hand, it is well-
known that every first-order predicate modal logic complete with respect to an
elementary class of Kripke frames, i.e., a class of frames definable by a classical
first-order formula, is recursively enumerable. On the other, numerous examples are
known of predicate modal logics, based on “natural” propositional modal logics with
essentially second-order Kripke semantics, that are either not recursively enumerable
or Kripke incomplete. This raises the question of whether every Kripke complete,
recursively enumerable predicate modal logic can be characterized by an elementary
class of Kripke frames. We answer this question in the negative, by constructing
a normal predicate modal logic which is Kripke complete, recursively enumerable,
but not complete with respect to an elementary class of frames. We also present an
example of a normal predicate modal logic that is recursively enumerable, Kripke
complete, and not complete with respect to an elementary class of rooted frames,
but is complete with respect to an elementary class of frames that are not rooted.
1 Introduction
It has been observed (see, e.g., [5]) that first-order predicate modal logics built on top of
propositional modal logics with essentially second-order Kripke semantics usually exhibit
some undesirable properties. Indeed, for all “natural” propositional modal logics with
essentially second-order Kripke semantics known from the literature—such asGL (Go¨del-
Lo¨b),Grz (Grzegorczyk), as well as their “linear” counterpartsGL.3 andGrz.3; the logic
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of finite Kripke frames; propositional dynamic logics; epistemic logics with the common
knowledge operator; and branching-time temporal logics CTL and CTL∗—the sets of
predicate modal formulas valid on their frames are not recursively enumerable [6, 8, 9, 10],
while the logics obtained by adding to their representations as Hilbert-style calculi, in
cases where there exists one, the axioms and inference rules of the classical first-order
logic are Kripke incomplete [4, 6, 8, 9, 10]. Thus, it would appear that, in predicate
modal logic, completeness with respect to Kripke semantics with essentially second-order
conditions and recursive enumerability might be incompatible. This, in particular, raises
the question of whether for Kripke complete predicate modal logics recursive enumerability
and completeness with respect to an elementary class of frames coincide.1
A partial answer was given in [5], where it was shown that recursive enumerability
and completeness with respect to an elementary class of frames do not coincide for Kripke
complete quasi-normal predicate modal logics; furthermore, it was assumed in [5], without
an explicit mention, that logics under consideration were exclusively those determined by
rooted frames, i.e., frames generated by a single world. The question of whether recursive
enumerability implies completeness with respect to an elementary class of frames for
Kripke complete normal predicate modal logics has, however, remained open.
In the present paper, we answer that question in the negative, by exhibiting an example
of a normal predicate modal logic that is Kripke complete, recursively enumerable, but
not complete with respect to an elementary class of Kripke frames. We also show that the
assumption of all frames for a logic being rooted may play a crucial role when answering
this question: we construct a normal predicate logic that enjoys the required properties if
we meta-logically restrict our attention to rooted frames, but ceases to enjoy them once
all frames are taken into consideration. This might be of independent interest, as for most
purposes in modal logic, it suffices to only consider rooted frames.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the necessary prelim-
inaries. In Section 3, we present an example of a normal predicate modal logic that is
Kripke complete, recursively enumerable, but not complete with respect to an elementary
class of rooted frames; we also show that this logic is complete with respect to an elemen-
tary class containing frames that are not required to be rooted. Then, in Section 4, we
present an example of a normal predicate modal logic that is Kripke complete, recursively
enumerable, but not complete with respect to an elementary class of any frames. We
conclude in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
A first-order predicate modal language contains countably many individual variables;
countably many predicate letters of every arity, including zero; Boolean connectives ¬
and ∧; the unary modal connective ✷; and the quantifier ∀. Atomic formulas, formulas,
as well as the symbols ∨, →, ∃, and ✸ are defined in the usual way. We assume that ∨
and ∧ bind stronger than →.
1A similar question can be posed for ∆-elementary classes of frames, i.e., classes of frames defined by
sets of first-order formulas; this is not the notion we consider in the present paper.
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Given a formula ϕ, we denote by md(ϕ) the modal depth of ϕ, which is defined
inductively, as follows:
md(α) = 0, where α is an atomic formula;
md(¬ϕ1) = md(ϕ1);
md(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = max{md(ϕ1), md(ϕ2)};
md(∀y ϕ1) = md(ϕ1);
md(✷ϕ1) = md(ϕ1) + 1.
We also inductively define, for every n ∈ N and every formula ϕ, the formulas ✷nϕ
and ✸nϕ, as follows: ✷0ϕ = ϕ, ✷n+1ϕ = ✷✷nϕ; ✸0ϕ = ϕ, ✸n+1ϕ = ✸✸nϕ.
A normal predicate modal logic is a set L of formulas containing the validities of the
classical first-order logic as well as the formulas of the form ✷(ϕ → ψ) → (✷ϕ → ✷ψ),
and closed under predicate substitution, modus ponens, generalization (if ϕ ∈ L, then
∀y ϕ ∈ L), and necessitation (if ϕ ∈ L, then ✷ϕ ∈ L).
Modal formulas can be interpreted using Kripke semantics. A Kripke frame is a
tuple F = 〈W,R〉, where W is a non-empty set of worlds and R is a binary accessibility
relation on W . A predicate Kripke frame is a tuple FD = 〈W,R,D〉, where 〈W,R〉 is
a frame and D is a function from W into a set of non-empty subsets of some set, the
domain of FD, satisfying the condition that wRw
′ implies D(w) ⊆ D(w′). We call the
set D(w) the domain of w. If a predicate frame satisfies the condition that wRw′ implies
D(w) = D(w′), we refer to it as a predicate frame with constant domains.
Note that a Kripke frame can be considered, in an obvious way, as a model for the
classical first-order language in the signature {R,=}.
A frame F = 〈W,R〉 is rooted if there exists w0 ∈ W such that w0R
∗w holds for every
w ∈ W , where R∗ is the reflexive and transitive closure of R. Given a frame 〈W,R〉 and
w,w′ ∈ W , we say that w′ is accessible from w or that w sees w′ if wRw′ holds. We say
that w ∈ W is a dead end if wRv does not hold for any v ∈ W . If C is a class of frames
and F ∈ C, we refer to F as a C-frame.
A Kripke model is a tuple M = 〈W,R,D, I〉, where 〈W,R,D〉 is a predicate Kripke
frame and I is a function assigning to a world w ∈ W and an n-ary predicate letter P
an n-ary relation I(w, P ) on D(w). We refer to I as an interpretation of predicate letters
with respect to worlds in W .
We say that a model 〈W,R,D, I〉 is based on the predicate frame 〈W,R,D〉 and
the frame 〈W,R〉; similarly, we say that a predicate frame 〈W,R,D〉 is based on the
frame 〈W,R〉. We also say that 〈W,R,D〉 is the underlying predicate frame for a model
〈W,R,D, I〉.
An assignment in a model is a function g associating with every individual variable y
an element g(y) of the domain of the underlying predicate frame.
The truth of a formula ϕ at a world w of a model M under an assignment g is defined
inductively, as follows:
• M, w |=g P (y1, . . . , yn) if 〈g(y1), . . . , g(yn)〉 ∈ I(w, P );
• M, w |=g ¬ϕ1 if M, w 6|=
g ϕ1;
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• M, w |=g ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if M, w |=
g ϕ1 and M, w |=
g ϕ2;
• M, w |=g ✷ϕ1 if wRw
′ implies M, w′ |=g ϕ1, for every w
′ ∈ W ;
• M, w |=g ∀y ϕ1 if M, w |=
g′ ϕ1, for every assignment g
′ such that g′ differs from g
in at most the value of y and such that g′(y) ∈ D(w).
We say that a formula ϕ is true at a world w of a model M and write M, w |= ϕ if
M, w |=g ϕ holds for every g assigning to free variables of ϕ elements of D(w). We say
that ϕ is valid at a world w of a frame F if M, w |= ϕ holds for every model M based on
F. We say that ϕ is true in M and write M |= ϕ if M, w |= ϕ holds for every world w of
M. We say that ϕ is valid on a predicate frame FD and write FD |= ϕ if ϕ is true in every
model based on FD. We say that ϕ is valid on a frame F and write F |= ϕ if ϕ is valid on
every predicate frame 〈F, D〉. We say that a set of formulas Γ is valid on a frame F and
write F |= Γ if F |= ϕ holds for every ϕ ∈ Γ. Finally, we say that a set of formulas is valid
on a class of frames if it is valid on every frame from the class.
Let M = 〈W,R,D, I〉 be a model, w ∈ W , and a1, . . . , an ∈ D(w). Let ϕ(y1, . . . , yn)
be a formula whose free variables are among y1, . . . , yn. We write M, w |= ϕ[a1, . . . , an]
to mean that M, w |=g ϕ(y1, . . . , yn), where g(y1) = a1, . . . , g(yn) = an.
Given a class of frames C, the set of predicate modal formulas valid on every C-frame
is denoted by L(C); this set is a normal predicate modal logic.
A normal predicate modal logic L is sound and complete with respect to a class of
frames C if L = L(C); in this case, for brevity, we also say that L is complete with respect
to C. A logic is Kripke complete if it is sound and complete with respect to some class of
frames.
A class C of frames is elementary if there exists a closed classical first-order formula
Φ in the signature {R,=} such that F ∈ C if, and only if, Φ is true in F considered as a
classical model, in which case we write F  Φ.
The following proposition is well-known (see [7], [2, Proposition 3.12.8]).
Proposition 2.1 Let C be an elementary class of frames. Then, L(C) is recursively
enumerable.
In the strict sense, the converse of Proposition 2.1 is not true, as some recursively
enumerable logics are not complete with respect to any class of frames whatsoever (i.e.,
are Kripke incomplete), and thus, are not complete with respect to any elementary class;
some examples have been mentioned in the Introduction (Section 1). A more interesting
question is whether every recursively enumerable Kripke complete logic is a logic of an
elementary class of frames.
The main contribution of this paper is in showing, which we do in Section 4, that
this is not so for normal predicate logics—namely, we exhibit an example of a recursively
enumerable Kripke complete normal predicate logic that is not complete with respect to
an elementary class of frames. Prior to that, however, we consider, in the next section, a
similar question for rooted frames.
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w1 w2 w3
· · ·
w∗
wn−1 wn
Figure 1: Frame Fn
3 An example over rooted frames
In this section, we exhibit the normal predicate modal logic L0 which is recursively enu-
merable, Kripke complete, but not complete with respect to an elementary class of rooted
frames. The restriction to rooted frames is sufficient for most purposes in modal logic;
we show, however, later on in this section that in the context of the present inquiry this
restriction does matter—while L0 is not complete with respect to an elementary class of
rooted frames, it is complete with respect to an elementary class of frames that are not
required to be rooted. In the next section, we discard the restriction to rooted frames;
the ideas introduced in this section are, however, reused in that context.
Let Fn, for n > 1, be the frame 〈Wn, Rn〉, where Wn = {w1, . . . , wn, w
∗} and
Rn = {〈wi, wi+1〉 : 1 6 i < n} ∪ {〈w1, w
∗〉}; the frame Fn is depicted in Figure 1.
Denote the set of all such frames by C∗, and let C0 = {F2n ∈ C
∗ : n > 1}; finally, let
L0 = L(C0).
The logic L0 is Kripke complete by definition. We next show that L0 is recursively
enumerable and that L0 is not complete with respect to an elementary class of rooted
frames.
To show that L0 is recursively enumerable, we effectively embed it into the classical
first-order logic with equality QCl=, whose set of theorems is known to be recursively
enumerable.
Let R and D be binary, and W unary, predicate letters not occurring in ϕ; intuitively,
W (x) means that x is a world, D(x, y) means that y is an element of the domain of x,
and R(x, y) means that y is accessible from x.
Let STx(ϕ) be the standard translation (see [7], [2, Section 3.12]) of the predicate
modal formula ϕ into the language of QCl=, defined as follows:
STx(P (y1, . . . , ym)) = P
′(y1, . . . , ym, x);
STx(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = STx(ϕ1) ∧ STx(ϕ2);
STx(¬ϕ1) = ¬STx(ϕ1);
STx(✷ϕ1) = ∀y (W (y) ∧R(x, y)→ STy(ϕ1));
STx(∀y ϕ1) = ∀y (¬W (y) ∧D(x, y)→ STx(ϕ1)),
where the arity of P ′ is one greater than the arity of P ; the letter P ′ is distinct from the
letter Q′ if, and only if, P is distinct from Q; and all the newly introduced individual
variables are distinct from the previously used ones. Intuitively, the variable x in STx(ϕ)
stands for the world at which ϕ is being evaluated.
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Let
M = ∃xW (x) ∧ ∀x [W (x)→ ∃y D(x, y)]∧
∧∀x∀y∀z [W (x) ∧W (y) ∧ ¬W (z) ∧ R(x, y) ∧D(x, z)→ D(y, z)].
The formula M describes general properties of predicate Kripke frames; it says that the
set of worlds is non-empty, that the domain of every world is non-empty, and that, if
world y is accessible from world x, the domain of x is included in the domain of y.
Let Fn be a classical first-order formula in the signature {R,=} describing, for a fixed
number n > 2, the disjoint union F⊎n of all the frames Fm ∈ C0 such that m 6 n. Since
F⊎n is finite, the formula Fn can be effectively constructed,—all we need to do is say which
worlds exist in F⊎n , that those worlds are pairwise distinct, that there are no other worlds
in F⊎n , and describe which worlds are, and which are not, related by the accessibility
relation.
Next, for an arbitrary classical first-order formula Φ in the signature {R,=}, induc-
tively define the formula Φ∗, as follows:
(x = y)∗ = (x = y);
(R(x, y))∗ = R(x, y);
(Φ1 ∧ Φ2)
∗ = Φ∗1 ∧ Φ
∗
2;
(¬Φ1)
∗ = ¬Φ∗1;
(∀xΦ1)
∗ = ∀x (W (x)→ Φ∗1).
Lastly, given a predicate modal formula ϕ, define
ϕ̂ = M ∧ F ∗md(ϕ)+3 → ∀x (W (x)→ STx(ϕ)).
Lemma 3.1 For every closed predicate modal formula ϕ, the following holds: ϕ ∈ L0 if,
and only if, ϕ̂ ∈ QCl=.
Proof. For the left-to-right, suppose that ϕ̂ /∈ QCl=, i.e., ϕ̂ fails in some classical first-
order model A. We build a Kripke model, based on a C0-frame, refuting ϕ. Since A M
and A  F ∗md(ϕ)+3, we can construct from A a predicate Kripke frame FD based on a
frame isomorphic to F⊎md(ϕ)+3. Since A 6 ∀x (W (x) → STx(ϕ)), for some assignment g,
both A g W (x) and A 6g STx(ϕ) hold. Recall that the standard translation has the
property (see, e.g., [2, Lemma 3.12.2]) that A g STx(ϕ) if, and only if, M, v |= ϕ, where
A and M are, respectively, classical and Kripke models agreeing on the interpretation of
the predicate letters of ϕ and where v is the world corresponding to the element g(x) of
A. Therefore, we conclude that M, w 6|= ϕ, where M is a model based on FD and w is
the world corresponding, under the isomorphism, to g(x). Since M is based on a frame
isomorphic to the frame F⊎md(ϕ)+3, which is a disjoint union of C0-frames, there exists a
model M′ based on a C0-frame such that M
′, w 6|= ϕ. Thus, ϕ /∈ L0.
For the converse, suppose that ϕ 6∈ L0. Then, M, ŵ 6|= ϕ, for some model M based on
a C0-frame and some world ŵ in M. We show that, then, ϕ fails in a model based on a
C0-frame Fm, where m 6 md(ϕ) + 3.
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If ŵ = w1, i.e., ŵ is the root of the frame underlying M, we define the sought model as
follows. Consider the chain w1Rw2R . . . of worlds of M; if it contains more than s worlds,
where
s =
{
md(ϕ) + 1, if md(ϕ) is odd,
md(ϕ) + 2, if md(ϕ) is even,
cut it off at ws to obtain the chain w1Rw2R . . . Rws together with w
∗ such that w1R
′w∗.
Since s 6 md(ϕ) + 3, we obtain that M′, w1 6|= ϕ, for a model M
′ based on one of the
disjunct frames from F⊎md(ϕ)+3.
If, on the other hand, ŵ is not the root of the frame underlying M, i.e., ŵ = wk, for
some k > 1 (notice that the case ŵ = w∗ is identical to k being the maximal index of
a world in M), we define the sought model as follows. First, if the chain wkRwk+1R . . .
contains more than md(ϕ)+1 worlds, we cut it off at wk+md(ϕ). Second, if md(ϕ) is even,
we replace the chain w1R . . .Rwk−1 together with w
∗ accessible from w1 by worlds w0 and
w∗ with the accessibilities w0R
′wk and w0Rw
∗; if, on the other hand, md(ϕ) is odd, we
put in an additional world between w0 and wk, so that the length of the resultant chain is
even. In either case, the length of the chain of worlds in M′ does not exceed md(ϕ) + 3.
Hence, M′, wk 6|= ϕ, for a model M
′ based on one of the disjunct frames from F⊎md(ϕ)+3.
Therefore, due to the aforementioned property of the standard translation, there
exists a classical first-order model A such that A 6M∧F ∗md(ϕ)+3 → ∀x (W (x)→ STx(ϕ)).
Thus, we conclude that ϕ̂ /∈ QCl=, as required. ✷
Lemma 3.2 Logic L0 is recursively enumerable.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 3.1. ✷
It remains to show that L0 is not complete with respect to an elementary class of
rooted frames.
Given a positive integer n, let
αn = ✸✷⊥ ∧✸
n
✷⊥.
It is easy to check that the formula αn is valid at worlds that see a dead end in one step
and also in n steps.
Lemma 3.3 Let n be a positive integer. Then, ¬αn ∈ L0 if, and only if, n is even.
Proof. Suppose n is even. Let Fm ∈ C0 and let w be a world in Fm. Assume that
Fm, w |= ✸✷⊥. Then, either w = w1 or w = wm−1 (notice that m > 2, since Fm ∈ C0).
Neither w1 nor wm−1, however, can see a dead end in an even number of steps. Indeed,
wm−1 can only see a dead end in one step. As for w1, it can see two dead ends—one of
them in one step, the other in m− 1 steps; but m− 1 is odd, since Fm ∈ C0 implies that
m is even. Therefore, Fm, w |= ¬αn holds for every w in Fm. Thus, ¬αn ∈ L0.
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Suppose n is odd. Then, Fn+1, w1 |= αn and, hence, Fn+1, w1 6|= ¬αn. Since Fn+1 ∈ C0,
we conclude that ¬αn /∈ L0. ✷
Now, let
alt2 = ✷p1 ∨ ✷(p1 → p2) ∨ ✷(p1 ∧ p2 → p3),
where p1, p2, and p3 are pairwise distinct propositional variables, i.e., 0-ary predicate
letters. The formula alt2 is valid at worlds that see at most two worlds (see, e.g., [1,
Proposition 3.45]). Hence, alt2 ∈ L0.
Lemma 3.4 Logic L0 is not complete with respect to an elementary class of rooted frames.
Proof. Assume otherwise, i.e, let L0 be complete with respect to an elementary class C
of rooted frames.
First, we prove that, for every n > 3,
Fn ∈ C ⇐⇒ n is even.
Suppose n is odd. Then, due to Lemma 3.3, ¬αn−1 ∈ L0. Since Fn, w1 6|= ¬αn−1, we
obtain Fn 6∈ C.
Suppose n is even. Then, due to Lemma 3.3, ¬αn−1 6∈ L0. Thus, there exists a rooted
frame F′ ∈ C and a world w such that F′, w |= αn−1. We show that, up to isomorphism,
F′ = Fn.
Let ζ = ✸p → ✷p. It is easy to check that ζ is valid at a world w if, and only if,
w sees at most one world. Since only the roots of C0-frames see more than one world,
✷ζ,¬ζ → ✸✷⊥ ∈ L0. Since alt2,✷ζ,¬ζ → ✸✷⊥ ∈ L0, if F ∈ C, then F has a branching
degree of at most two, no world in F seen from another world sees more than one world
(i.e., only the root of F may see two worlds), and if the root of F sees two worlds, one of
them is a dead end. Since F′, w |= αn−1, the world w is the root of F
′, and w sees dead
ends in one and n− 1 steps. Therefore, as claimed, F′ is isomorphic to Fn.
Now, to obtain a contradiction, it remains to notice that classical first-order formulas
cannot distinguish even and odd linear orders (see, e.g., [3, Corollary 3.12]). ✷
We, thus, obtain the following:
Theorem 3.5 There exists a normal predicate modal logic which is Kripke complete,
recursively enumerable, and not complete with respect to an elementary class of rooted
frames.
Proof. Take L0 as such a logic. ✷
We next show that the assumption of only considering rooted frames is essential to
the example presented above.
Proposition 3.6 There exists an elementary class C∗0 of frames which are not rooted such
that L0 = L(C
∗
0).
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“bottom part”
“regular part” “regular part” “regular part”
w1
w2 w3 w4
w∗
· · ·
w2k−1 w2k y x
zw∗2 w
∗
4 w
∗
2k
Figure 2: Regular construction for C∗0-frames
Proof. We construct C∗0 so that it contains frames that resemble those in C0, but where
every world w2k is marked off by an additional world w
∗
2k, which sees w2k. This enables
us to tell apart evenly and oddly numbered elements of the chain of worlds of a frame.
Then, we make sure that a chain of a frame in C∗0 does not end with an oddly numbered
world. Notice that C∗0 might contain frames that do not look exactly like C0-frames with
“additional” worlds w∗2k; in particular, it might contain infinite frames; this is, however,
immaterial to our argument.
We now describe C∗0-frames with classical first-order formulas (also, see Figure 2).
First, we say that C∗0-frames are irreflexive and do not contain transitive chains with
more than two elements:
Φ1 = ∀x¬R(x, x) ∧ ∀x∀y∀z (R(x, y) ∧R(y, z)→ ¬R(x, z)).
Second, we describe the “bottom part” of a C∗0-frame, which looks as follows: the bottom-
most world w1 sees two worlds, w
∗ and w2, which is also seen from w
∗
2, all these worlds
being distinct (that w2 is only seen from w1 and w
∗
2 follows from the formula Φ3 below):
Φ2(w1) = ∃w
∗∃w2∃w
∗
2 [∀x (R(w1, x)↔ x = w
∗ ∨ x = w2)
∧ R(w∗2, w2) ∧ ¬∃xR(x, w1) ∧ ¬∃xR(x, w
∗
2)
∧ ∀x (R(x, w∗)→ x = w1) ∧ ¬∃xR(w
∗, x) ∧ w1 6= w
∗
2].
Third, we say that the bottom-most world w1 is the only one that can see more than one
world and that no world is seen from more than two worlds:
Φ3(w1) = ∀x (x 6= w1 → ¬∃y∃z (y 6= z ∧R(x, y) ∧R(x, z))) ∧
∀w¬∃x∃y∃z (x 6= y ∧ y 6= z ∧ x 6= z ∧R(x, w) ∧R(y, w) ∧R(z, w)).
Lastly, we describe the repetitive procedure of extending an C∗0-frame by appending to the
topmost world w two worlds y and x, distinct from w and each other, such that wRyRx
holds, as well as a world z that lies off the main chain and sees x (intuitively, z marks off
x as the topmost world):
Φ4 = ∀w [∃y∃z (y 6= z ∧ R(y, w) ∧ R(z, w))→
¬∃xR(w, x) ∨
∃x∃y∃z (R(w, y) ∧R(y, x) ∧R(z, x) ∧ y 6= z ∧ x 6= w ∧
∀u (R(u, y)→ u = w) ∧ ¬∃uR(u, z))].
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The procedure of extending a C∗0-frame described by Φ4 can be carried out arbitrarily,
including infinitely, many times.
Then, the class C∗0 is defined to contain the frames satisfying the following classical
first-order formula:
∃w1(Φ1 ∧ Φ2(w1) ∧ Φ3(w1) ∧ Φ4).
We claim that L(C∗0) = L(C0).
To see that L(C0) ⊆ L(C
∗
0), let F, w 6|= ϕ, for some F ∈ C
∗
0 and some w in F. Let Fw
be a subframe of F generated by w.
If w 6= w1, since the branching factor of F is two and only the bottom-most world w1
of F can see two worlds, Fw is a chain of worlds. If we take the initial segment F
′
w of this
chain of length at most md(ϕ)+1, then clearly, F′w is isomorphic to a generated subframe
of some frame in C0 and, moreover, F
′
w, w 6|= ϕ. Hence, in this case, ϕ /∈ L(C0).
If, on the other hand, w = w1, the world w sees a dead end w
∗ and also sees a chain
w1Rw2R . . . of worlds that is built in repetitive stages, starting from w1 and w2 and being
extended at every stage by exactly two worlds; hence, the chain w1Rw2R . . . is either
infinite or contains an even number of worlds. In either case, we can find a frame F ∈ C0
such that F, w1 6|= ϕ; thus, if w = w1, we also obtain ϕ /∈ L(C0).
To see that L(C∗0) ⊆ L(C0), notice that, given Fn ∈ C0, where Fn = 〈Wn, Rn〉, if we
make every world w2k ∈ Wn accessible from an additional world w
∗
2k, then the resulting
frame F∗n is in C
∗
0. Since, for every w ∈ Wn, the subframe of Fn generated by w coincides
with the subframe of F∗n generated by w, we obtain that ϕ /∈ L(C0) implies ϕ /∈ L(C
∗
0), as
required.
Since L0 = L(C0), we conclude that L0 = L(C
∗
0). ✷
Thus, the assumption of all frames under consideration being rooted is not insignificant
in the context of the present enquiry. We do, however, show in the next section that, if
we discard the restriction to rooted frames, the answer to the main question considered
in this paper remains negative.
4 An example over arbitrary frames
In this section, we exhibit the normal predicate modal logic L1 that is recursively enu-
merable, Kripke complete, but not complete with respect to an elementary class of any
frames.
Given n > 2, let Gn be the frame 〈Wn, Rn〉, where Wn = {w1, w2, . . . , wn, w
∗} and
Rn = {〈wi, wi+1〉 : 1 6 i < n} ∪ {〈wn, w1〉, 〈w1, w
∗〉}. In other words, Gn is a ring made
up of n worlds, such that one world of the ring sees a dead end; the frame Gn is depicted
in Figure 3. Denote the set of all such frames by C′, and let C1 = {Gn ∈ C
′ : n is even};
finally, let L1 = L(C1).
To show that L1 is recursively enumerable, we effectively embed it into the classical
first-order logic with equality QCl=. The embedding is very similar to the one defined in
the preceding section for L0. The only difference is in the description, using a classical first-
10
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
w6
w∗
wn
Figure 3: Frame Gn
order formula, of a particular frame that fails a modal formula in case the corresponding
classical formula is not valid.
Let Gn be a classical first-order formula in the signature {R,=} that, for a fixed
number n > 2, describes the disjoint union G⊎n of all the frames Gm in C1 such that
m 6 n. Since G⊎n is finite, Gn can be effectively constructed.
Let the formula M , as well as the translations ·∗ and STx(·), be defined as previously.
Given a predicate modal formula ϕ, define
ϕ¯ = M ∧G∗md(ϕ)+3 → ∀x (W (x)→ STx(ϕ)).
Lemma 4.1 For every closed predicate modal formula ϕ, the following holds: ϕ ∈ L1 if,
and only if, ϕ¯ ∈ QCl=.
Proof. The left-to-right implication is argued as in Lemma 3.1.
For the right-to-left, assume that ϕ /∈ L1, i.e., M, w¯ 6|= ϕ, for some model M based
on a C1-frame, say Gn, and some world w¯ in M. We show that, then, ϕ fails in a model
based on a C1-frame Gm, where m 6 md(ϕ) + 3.
If w¯ = w∗, then clearly M′, w∗ 6|= ϕ holds for a model M′ based on the frame G2.
Assume, on the other hand, that w¯ = wk, for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If n 6 md(ϕ) + 3,
then we are done. Otherwise, let G′ be either Gmd(ϕ)+2 or Gmd(ϕ)+3, whichever belongs
to C1 (one of them, clearly, does). It is easy to see that G
′ contains a world w′ such
that the subframe of G′ made up of worlds reachable from w′ in at most md(ϕ) steps is
isomorphic to the subframe of Gn made up of worlds reachable from w¯ in at most md(ϕ)
steps. Hence, M′, w′ 6|= ϕ holds for a model M′ based on G′.
Therefore, due to the property of the standard translation mentioned in
the proof of Lemma 3.1, there exists a classical first-order model A such that
A 6M ∧G∗md(ϕ)+3 → ∀x (W (x)→ STx(ϕ)). Thus, ϕ̂ /∈ QCl=. ✷
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Lemma 4.2 Logic L1 is recursively enumerable.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 4.1. ✷
It remains to show that L1 is not complete with respect to an elementary class of
frames. To that end, we define the following formulas:
βn = ✸✷⊥ ∧✸
n
✸✷⊥ ∧
n−1∧
k=1
¬✸k✸✷⊥;
γ = ✸✷⊥ ∨ (✸p→ ✷p);
δkn = ✸
kβn ∧ p→ ✸
np;
εn = βn ∧ p→ ✷
n(βn ∧ p),
where p is a propositional variable.
Lemma 4.3 The formula βn is valid at a world w if, and only if, w can see a dead
end, can see in n steps a world that sees a dead end, and cannot see in any number
k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} of steps a world that sees a dead end.
The formula γ is valid on a frame F if, and only if, only those worlds of F that see a
dead end can see more than one world.
The formula δkn is valid on a frame F if, and only if, every world in F that can see in
k steps a world w such that w |= βn can see itself in n steps.
The formula εn is valid on a frame F if, and only if, every world w of F such that
w |= βn cannot see in n steps a world w
′ 6= w.
Proof. We only remark on εn, leaving the rest to the reader.
Notice that the truth status of βn at a world does not depend on the interpretation.
If F contains a world w such that w |= βn and w can see in n steps a word w
′ 6= w, then
M, w 6|= εn if M is a model based on F such that M, v |= p if, and only if, v = w. ✷
Recall that the formula alt2 is valid at worlds that see at most two worlds.
Lemma 4.4 The following formulas belong to L1: alt2; γ; δ
k
n, for every k, n; εn, for every
n.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that every C1-frame satisfies the properties
associated with the formulas listed in the statement of the lemma. ✷
Lemma 4.5 Let n be a natural number such that n > 1. Then, ¬βn ∈ L1 if, and only if,
n is odd.
Proof. Suppose n is odd. Let Gm ∈ C1 and let w be a world in Gm. Assume that
Gm, w |= ✸✷⊥. Due to Lemma 4.3, this is only possible if w = w1. Since in no C1-frame
can w1 see a dead end in an odd number of steps, Gm, w |= ¬βn holds for every w in Gm;
thus, ¬βn ∈ L1.
Suppose n is even. Then, due to Lemma 4.3, Gn, w1 |= βn and, hence, Gn, w1 6|= ¬βn.
Since Gn ∈ C1, we conclude that ¬βn /∈ L1. ✷
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Lemma 4.6 Logic L1 is not complete with respect to an elementary class of frames.
Proof. Assume otherwise, i.e, let L1 be complete with respect to an elementary class
C of frames. Further assume that C is defined by a classical first-order formula Φ with
quantifier rank n.
Since 2n is even, due to Lemma 4.5, ¬β2n /∈ L1. Therefore, C contains a
frame F = 〈W,R〉 and w1 ∈ W such that F, w1 |= β2n . Thus, F contains
worlds w1, . . . , w2n+1, w
∗
1, w
∗
2n+1 such that w1Rw2 . . . w2nRw2n+1, as well as w1Rw
∗
1 and
w2n+1Rw
∗
2n+1. Since F |= γ, every wi ∈ {w2, . . . , w2n} can see only one world, which is,
thus, wi+1. As F |= ε2n, due to Lemma 4.3, w1 = w2n+1. Since F |= alt2, we obtain
w∗2n+1 = w
∗
1 or w
∗
2n+1 = w2. Since F |= δ
k
2n , for every k, no world in X = {w1, . . . w2n} is
seen from a world in W \X . Indeed, suppose otherwise, i.e., let vRw, for some v ∈ W \X
and some w ∈ X . Then, vRkw1 holds for some k ∈ N. Since F, v |= δ
k
2n , there is a path
of length 2n from v to v. Notice that the said path cannot contain worlds from X ; hence,
w is not part of this path, and thus v can see at least two worlds neither of which is a
dead end. But, as F, v |= γ, the world v also sees a dead end, which contradicts the fact
that F, v |= alt2.
Thus, F looks like a ring of 2n worlds, where one world in the ring also sees a dead
end, and where no world not in the ring can see a world in the ring. Now, consider a
frame F′ that looks like F, except that its ring is made up of 2n + 1, rather than 2n,
worlds. Since, due to Lemma 4.5, ¬β2n+1 ∈ L1, we obtain F
′ /∈ C. One can, however, use
Ehrenfeucht–Fra¨ısse´ games (see, e.g., [3, Chapter 3]) to show that Φ cannot distinguish
F from F′, which gives us a contradiction. ✷
Theorem 4.7 There exists a normal predicate modal logic which is Kripke complete,
recursively enumerable, and not complete with respect to an elementary class of frames.
Proof. Take L1 as such a logic. ✷
5 Conclusion
The main result of the present paper is the construction of an example of a normal
predicate modal logic that is Kripke complete, recursively enumerable, and not complete
with respect to an elementary class of Kripke frames, which solves the problem left open
in [5]. Notice that our example is a conservative extension of the classical first-order
logic, as no restrictions on either the sizes of the domains of the worlds or the possible
interpretations of predicate letters have been used in its construction. Also notice that a
similar example can be constructed, along the same lines, of a logic of predicate frames
with constant domains.
It remains unclear to us whether a similar example can be constructed in the extensions
of the intuitionistic predicate logic. A step toward answering that question would the
construction of a normal predicate modal logic, satisfying the properties studied in this
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paper, whose frames are reflexive and transitive, as is the accessibility relation in the
extensions of the intuitionistic logic. While it is not difficult to modify the example
presented in Section 4 to construct a logic, satisfying the same properties, of reflexive
frames, it is not clear to us whether an example over reflexive and transitive—or, simply,
transitive—frames exists.
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